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PETITION

i.<) Ru] e 35, Rules of the Utah Court of

Pu rsuant
Appeals,

appellant

rehearing.

(Trimble)

respectful 1 v petitions

The grounds for f b i ;-i nint 10

for

a

are as stated below.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Trimble

is a broker,

gerald is a m; - •
sued

Fitzgexi

Trimble

lost.

Ohran

HI ai i oa "
Buyer)

for

is

i seller.

dc» i.un, Trimble
real

estate

Fitz(Broker)

commission.

Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626

P.2d 453 (Utah 1981) .
Thereafter,
for

"

real

transaction.

estate

Trimble

(Broker)

commission

growing

sued

Ohran

out

(Seller)
t h<=>

same

This second suit was dismissed on the basis of

collateral estoppel

Tlm«

the trial court judge ruled that:

The issue at the first trial and the
present issue are essentially the same,
that is, whether a real estate commission
was due Florence from the sale of Monte
Vista Ranch, Inc. . . .and if so, who
should pay the commission. (R.252.)

This court's opinion turned what documents were
available to the trial court.

This court reasoned that:

From all that appears in the Supreme
Court opinion, the jury's judgment that
Fitzgerald did not owe a commission means
that Trimble was not entitled to a
commission at all [from either Buyer or
Seller.]
Slip Opinion, at p. 5.
On the other hand, the court conceded that the
opinion standing alone might be misleading:
Close examination of the record in a
proceeding may well lead to a conclusion
somewhat at odds with the apparent
"plain meaning" of a reported decision.
Slip Opinion, at p. 6.
Thus, this court's opinion turned exclusively on
whether the trial court should have taken judicial notice of
certain records from the earlier trial.
.[T]he trial court did not err in
failing to review the record of the prior
proceedings on its own motion. It is not
mandatory that we take notice of the
record in that proceeding for the first
time on appeal. . .
Slip Opinion, at p. 9.
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ARGUMENT

• • ' < aly true

It

thai

"Trimble attempted to

inject documents from the first trial at a fairly late stage
of the proceedings

It is also true t B? -, j •:

received) w

* n useful in clarifying the collateral

estoppel issue.

However, Trimble has never contended that

such documents were indispensable
consistently

argued

incorrect

the

on

.nients (if

that

basis

the
of

Indeed, Trimble has
trial

the

court's

existing

ruling

record!

was

It is

respectfully submitted that UILS Court's opinion wholly fails
to analyze the collateral estoppel issue on the basis of the
existing record.
The language at issue was a jury instruction which
states:
.The agreement of December 7, 19 7 7
imposed upon defendant the liability for
the real estate commission, if any, owed
plaintiffs upon this transaction.
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453, 455
(Utah 1981).

(Emphasis added.)

The trial court believed the words if any means
that no one in the world owed Trimble (Broker) a commission.
The fallacy is that the trial coui

3

rather to look at

the caption.

This was a lawsuit between Trimble (Broker) and

Fitzgerald (Buyer).

The only thing which could possibly have

been adjudicated in that earlier trial was whether Fitzgerald
(Buyer) owed a commission to Trimble (Broker).

If we want to

know whether anyone in the world owes a commission to Trimble
(Broker)f everyone in the world would have to be added as
party

defendants.

The

point

is

so

elementary

that

no

citation is required.
It is true that the Ohran (Seller) was involved in
the prior suit.

However, he was involved in a cross-claim

with

(Buyer).

Fitzgerald

However,

nothing to do with Trimble

(Broker).

that

cross-claim

had

Or stated in other

words, the original lawsuit did not involve any claim by
Trimble

(Broker) against Ohran

(Seller) for a real estate

commission.
The trial court was fully aware of the nature of
the original
argued.

lawsuit.

Early

Indeed, the matter was

in the litigation, Ohran

frequently

(Seller) made a

motion to dismiss on the basis that Ohran (Seller) was an
indispensable party in the original action.

(R,17, R.20.)

Actually, that argument was simply a res judicata argument
under a different name.

(R.49, at Point III.)
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In any case (whatever the name), the relationships
in the earlier case were exp] a i ned to the trial
great detail-

(R.39, R.90.)

judge in

Indeed, plaintiff's entire

trial brief from the earlier trial was presented to the trial
court.

) Thai document describes the relationships in

graphic form.
Later, Ohran

(Seller) made

,-\ motion for summary

judgment based upon collateral estoppel,
made

ai1

appropriate

response•

Trimble (Seller)

(R.16 5-166.)

Although

Trimblp s response on collateral estoppel was a bit brief, it
must be remembered that Trimble (Broker) had earlier in the
case explained those same relationships to the Court in great
detail

I h

i'J

M,

'Ml.)

OiI appeal, this Court
court

had

no duty

to take

concluded

judicial notice of

records from another trial in another county.
at p. fi and 7. i

that the trial
files and

(Slip Opinion,

However, shouldn't the trial court have

taken judicial notice of its own file?

Indeed, shouldn't the

trial court have taken judicial notice of the caption in Mel
Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, supra?

5

In the briefing before this Court, Trimble (Broker)
showed that the relationships from the earlier trial were
available in the Court's own file—without resort to judicial
notice,

(Appellant's

Brief, at p. 15; Appellant's Reply

Brief, at p. 1-6.)
DATED this 2~ {

day of

QTUJLA

, 1988.

ROBERT J. D£BRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I c e r t i f y t h a t on the

2 2 . day of

'v—hM-Lti

1

,

-9

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S
BRIEF

(Trimble v. Monte Vista

Ranch,

Inc.), was mailed,

postage prepaid, by depositing a copy of the same in the U.S.
mail, to the following:
M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 888
Provo, Utah
84603
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